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Abstract 
Relying on the case of asbestos in France, we study a deinstitutionalization process as a 
result of successive and cumulative struggles. There are competing interests in specific 
institutional arrangements. Actors who want to disrupt institutions have to face with 
other actors who benefit from the existing order. We emphasize the longitudinal role of 
these struggles and depict deinstitutionalization as a process that is achieved over a long 
period. Most struggles do not succeed in disrupting a practice but produce residues that 
slightly change rules, beliefs, cognitive schemes and practices. We explore the 
longitudinal evolution of discourse from 1920 to 1997 concerning asbestos and analyze 
the impacts of successive struggles. In that way, we explain changes that are reflected by 
discourse. Discourse analysis partially relies here on Prospéro, a piece of software 
devoted to the exploration of texts produced in a contestation context.  
 
 
The paper attempts to explore the long process that has led to the deinstitutionalization of 
asbestos in France, first considered as a “magic mineral”. Asbestos is a natural fibre that was 
already known by the old Greeks. It became increasingly popular in the 19th century during 
the industrial revolution. Asbestos can resist to heat, chemical damage, and electricity. It also 
absorbs sounds.  Due to these unique insulation properties, its use became generalized. By the 
mid of the 20th century, asbestos could be found almost everywhere, under different shapes 
and was possibly mixed with other materials like cement. For example, it was used for 
concrete, roofing, pipe insulation, clothes and even for cigarettes.  
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Figure 1 shows the sharp rise in asbestos importation into France, culminating at about 
180 000 tons in 1974. 
However, this rise should not be understood as an uncontested adoption. Early studies, such as 
Dr Murray’s post-mortem exam in 1899, pointed out the possible dangers of asbestos. The 
following studies from the 20s, more systematic and based on larger samples demonstrated 
the noxiousness of asbestos and in some cases its lethal consequences.  
 
 
Figure 1 : Importation of asbestos into France 
 
Yet, these successive scientific reports did not put an end to the development of asbestos. On 
the contrary, its importation increased, and the practices associated with asbestos remained 
stable, except some slight and progressive changes. This persistence in spite of alarming 
medical cases is a puzzling phenomenon which is interesting to explore.  
It emphasizes the longitudinal dimension of deinstitutionalization. The decline of asbestos 
only began in the 80s. In 1997, the use of asbestos was totally banned. We argue that this 
decline and eventually the ban of asbestos are not only due to events that occurred at that time 
but echoes the past struggles that – even unsuccessful – have induced slight and progressive 
changes. We attempt to understand to which extent each struggle can lead to regulative, 
normative and cognitive changes even if these changes are minor and partially integrated into 
the existing institution. 
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In this paper, we examine asbestos as an institution, drawing on Scott’s “omnibus” definition: 
“institutions are comprised of regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive elements that, 
together with associated activities and resources provide stability and meaning to social life” 
(Scott 2008, p.48).  
Relying on this institutional framework, asbestos appears to be constrained and framed by 
three pillars, regulative, normative and culturo-cognitive. The issue of stability and 
persistence is included in the very definition of an institution. The alignment between the 
three pillars ensures a strong stability, since practices acquire the status of taken-for-granted 
actions that are also supported by formal systems such as rules, and are endorsed by common 
values and norms. To that extent, Scott (2008, p.62) argues that “when the pillars are aligned, 
the strength of their combined forces can be formidable”. The study of Caronna (2004) in the 
US care field is a good illustration. 
This definition of institution depicts three main dimensions of institutions to describe their 
main components.  However, little is said here about the process that constitutes institutions. 
For Bartey and Tolbert (1997, p.99) institutions are “historical accretions of past practices and 
understandings that set conditions on actions”. This definition emphasizes the historical 
dimension of institutions that draw on past events to constrain present actions.   
To study asbestos as a deinstitutionalization case, we focus on the historical dimension of the 
institution and the process under which practices and understandings in the field are 
progressively de-accreted.  While many studies about institutional change have relied on 
longitudinal analysis over several decades (amongst others Chung and Luo 2008; Greenwood, 
Suddaby and Hinings 2002; Hoffman 1999; Leblebici, Salancik, Copay and King 1991; 
Tolbert and Zucker 1983), studies about institutional disruption or deinstitutionalization have 
been interested in shorter periods, rather focusing on a crystallised moment that provokes the 
disruption of a practice. For example Ahmadjian and Robinson (2001) attempt to explain the 
deinstitutionalization of permanent employment in Japan. For that purpose, they focus on the 
role of downsizing in Japanese firms in a fairly short period between 1990 and 1997. Little is 
said about older events that have prepared the basis of change. 
Our analysis is based on a series of “struggles” from the 50s that have lead to the 
deinstitutionalization of asbestos. In particular, we conduct a systematic analysis of texts that 
have been produced around the issue of asbestos between 1970 and 1997. Before, little has 
been said about asbestos, except scientific or technical reports. We use a lexicometric 
program – Prospéro – that is particularly adapted for the study of struggles (Chateauraynaud 
2003; Chateauraynaud and Torny 1999). We show how different successive struggles have 
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impacted the asbestos institution, exploring the temporal dynamics between the regulative, 
normative and cognitive pillars. We emphasize the concept of residues that we describe as the 
remains of a struggle. They constitute a potential basis for change and put forward the 
significant role of any struggle, whether it is successful or not.  
Institutional dynamics and deinstitutionalization 
Oliver (1992, p.564) defined deinstitutionalization as “the delegitimation of an established 
organizational practice or procedure as a result of organizational challenges to or the failure of 
organizations to reproduce previously legitimated or taken-for-granted organizational 
actions”. This study emphasizes deinstitutionalization as a process that is longitudinally 
achieved through a series of struggles. We underline the dynamic dimension of institutions 
and shed light on agency and struggles implied in the logics of change opposed to the logics 
of persistence. 
 
The issue of change in institutional literature has been increasingly studied these last years 
and has mainly crystallized around the analysis of institutionalization process and the 
institutional entrepreneur (amongst others: Barley and Tolbert 1997; Holm 1995; Lanzara and 
Patriotta 2007; Maguire, Hardy and Lawrence 2004; Perkmann and Spicer 2008). However, 
little is known about how institutional practices change or disappear (Greenwood et al. 2002; 
Oliver 1992). Similarly, the temporal effects of institutional mechanisms has been 
underestimated, and has rarely been systematically analyzed (Lawrence, Winn and Jennings 
2001). It is yet a fundamental question to further explore the logics underlying stability and 
change. 
 
Up till now main researches about change and disruption in institutions have emphasized the 
role of jolts (Meyer, Brooks and Goes 1990) that destabilize established practices in three 
ways, technological, social and regulatory (Greenwood et al. 2002). Jolts catalyze the 
evolution of the field and precipitate its change. As instance, Maguire’s and Hardy’s research 
(2009) underline the role of the publication of Silent Hill as a jolt to change practices dealing 
with DDT.  However, we agree with Munir (2005) on the fact that institutional change cannot 
be attributed to a single event – a jolt. Instead, change is the effect of a social construction of 
events that are collectively assimilated, sorted out and theorized. To that extent, the effect of a 
jolt is rather due to the crystallization of past events that have been socially constructed. 
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Oliver’s study (1992) also emphasizes deinstitutionalization as a process that is achieved over 
time.  
Institutional struggles and residues 
With this focus on processual dimension of institutions, the efforts of actors to purposively act 
upon institutions, or institutional work, as it has been coined by Lawrence and Suddaby 
(2006) are directly connected to deinstitutionalization process. We assume that institutional 
work is dynamic and inscribed in a momentum - that is an energy associated with a common 
inspiration. Jansen (2004) distinguishes statis-based momentum and change-based 
momentum. In both cases, actors’ efforts are inscribed in a specific path and course of actions. 
Actions are temporarily situated. They are both embedded in a specific history and also 
inspire upcoming actions. To that extent, institutional work, at a particular time, echoes the 
history of the field. 
The dynamism underlying deinstitutionalization and institutional work is not only temporal 
but refers to struggles between actors. In highly institutionalized fields, specific practices are 
taken for granted and are extremely resistant to change. Many actors are yet engaged into 
efforts to influence institutions (DiMaggio 1988; Lawrence and Suddaby 2006; Oliver 1991; 
Oliver 1992) which is a concrete manifestation of agency. Though institutions generate order, 
there are still conflicts and contradictions (Powell and DiMaggio 1991) and actors compete 
around divergent interests. Institutional work is thus inscribed in institutional struggles. These 
struggles are rarely the opposition between equal forces. As it is shown by Bourdieu (1977), 
actors are differently endowed with capital, which generates sources of power, and defines 
different hierarchical positions amongst the actors of the field. The actors in favour of 
institutional change compete with those who aim at maintaining the existing institution. These 
struggles are asymmetrical, and in highly institutionalized fields, defenders of maintenance 
can have a significant power, and legitimacy – for example the role of elite agencies in 
effecting institutional ends (Lawrence et al. 2001). An important issue is to determine who 
benefits from specific institutional arrangements. To that extent, even if the political side of 
institutional change has mainly been eluded, the study of deinstitutionalization is more 
consistent if it is considered as an ongoing series of asymmetrical struggles, with competing 
practices aiming either at change or maintenance. These struggles, in spite of asymmetry, are 
not purely vain and can be productive.  Even if an action for change is unsuccessful, it leaves 
a residue. We can define it as a set of values, beliefs, and practices defended by institutional 
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actors that have emerged from the institutional struggle and that has been incorporated into 
the existing institution. These residues can participate to change and to a progressive 
delegitimation of a practice when they are cumulated. 
There has been no study of the longitudinal role of these residues in the deinstitutionalization 
process. This question is yet crucial, since it documents the role of successive struggles. In 
that case, deinstitutionalization would be neither a radical nor incremental change but a 
longitudinal process in which residues play a latent and cumulative role. The reality is not 
only constituted by what is manifested but also by its dormant dimensions.  Different or even 
antagonist logics can be merged in a single complex reality (Morin 1990). Using Morin’s 
terminology, our goal is then the understanding of the dialogic between persistence and 
change as they are expressed in successive struggles in deinstitutionalization process. 
 
The case of asbestos in France 
To study a series of struggles and the successive residues which have been produced, we 
analyze the case of asbestos in France. This case illustrates an exemplary 
deinstitutionalization process. From a “magical mineral” to the “the public enemy number 
one”, asbestos has been progressively considered as a lethal substance and has been 
forbidden. Asbestos is a world controversy, but the study of the French case in particular is 
interesting for two main reasons. The controversy in France has brought major social 
struggles and has generated a large coalition of opponents and defenders of asbestos.  Second, 
it is noticeable for the length of the conflict (asbestos is forbidden in France only in 1997, 
instead of the 80’s for most other industrialized countries). Actors implied in the struggles are 
extremely diversified and evolve from 1920 to 1997.  
From 1906 to 1945, few researchers (especially from the USA and from Great Britain) had 
studied and questioned the link between cancers and exposition to asbestos. Workers, exposed 
to asbestos, were not well organized and didn’t have information. Industrials (mainly 
represented by St-Gobain and Externit in France) supported by politics tried to maintain the 
asbestos practice and were not really threatened by the results of these studies. Their first 
reactions were “no-reactions”. However doubt, as a cognitive residue, can be perceived as a 
consequence of the institutional work in the field. 
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In 1945, asbestosis is officially recognized as an industrial disease by the French authority. 
And the official recognition is a regulative residue as a first step in the awareness of political 
actors. 
From the 1950s, evidence concerning problems with asbestos still accumulated: from 1950 to 
1960, we can observe a multiplication of studies that showed the link between asbestos and 
cancers. A part of the profession agreed with these critical studies, whereas the other part 
claimed that the noxiousness is not significant and can be controlled.  Then, as the number of 
deaths was increasing, trade unions organized themselves against asbestos. Factories were 
occupied: we can take the example of Amisol in December 1974 (see Appendix 1), which 
becomes the symbol of the fight against asbestos. The workers’ mobilisation aroused doubts 
among their employers. The asbestos industrial union organized a symposium the 29th and 
30th of May 1964. Officially, French industrials could no longer deny that they were aware of 
the asbestos consequences. This point appeared important when the regulative crisis began in 
1990. At the end of the 70s, new actors appeared. The most representative is the “Collectif de 
Jussieu”. It was created in 1977 in Paris to denounce the danger of a passive exposition to 
asbestos. This organization aimed at representing people working in one of the biggest French 
University (most of them were professors). The “Collectif de Jussieu” managed to 
communicate in mass media and succeeded in connecting different movements (its action 
with Amisol workers was a tipping point in the debate). Meanwhile, the French government 
support was also declining: for example they decided to control the use of asbestos (with the 
1977 decree), which can be considered as a regulative residue.   
This context of doubt led defenders of asbestos to contradictions. For example, the union of 
asbestos industrial claimed in press that there is no danger to work in an office built with 
asbestos. In the same time, the RATP (Parisian public transport organisation) restored many 
underground stations to protect workers. These internal contradictions brought a lack of 
legitimacy amongst the defenders of asbestos. To reduce this dissonance, a new committee is 
created: the CPA (Asbestos Permanent Committee) in 1982. This committee, gathering 
industrials, researchers and workers’ representatives, had to take decision concerning asbestos 
in France. Criticisms rapidly appeared. Even if several researchers belonged to this 
committee, its neutrality was quickly outlined: this committee was financed by the asbestos 
industrials. In the same time, international pressure grew (France had to apply European 
directives that were very restrictive concerning asbestos). Conferences, debates were 
organised by the defenders of maintenance. Suspicion and fear increased among the 
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population. The creation of the CPA was denounced as a manipulative strategy. From 1978 to 
1992, the media remained fairly silent, which explains the fact that most people were not 
informed about asbestos. 
This feeling of trickery led to the last political crisis of asbestos when a group of widows 
decided to go on trial in1992. This crisis led to the ban of asbestos in 1997 and it was the final 
step of the deinstitutionalization process.  
 
The main actors in the field: position and interests 
 
Workers’ Unions  
Workers represent the biggest group of victims of asbestos. From 1970 to 1997, the position 
of workers changed considerably. From 1970 to 1977, workers were not aware of the asbestos 
risks. Unions wanted to protect employment, in spite of the dangers induced by asbestos. 
Besides, workers’ unions are fragmented and sometimes, depending on topics, there are 
tensions between them.  
M. Bailleul, an FO union representative, about the discourse of the CGT union (close 
to the head office) : “They explained us that asbestos is not a pain, it is not more 
dangerous than lead ; asbestos is a tool and a raw material for us… asbestos will be 
there forever.”1 
The visit of the “Collectif de Jussieu” in 1976 radically changed their point of view. Even if 
they were afraid of being unemployed, the question of health at work became central.  
 “One day, in 1976, Professors from Jussieu have contacted us, Henri [Pézerat] and 
his colleagues. Of course, we agreed to meet them. Henry immediately realized that 
we didn’t know anything! Directly, he asked: “Do you know that asbestos is 
dangerous? Do you have lung diseases?” That’s it. He didn’t know how to explain to 
us… And… it was terrifying because we realized that something awful would arrive. 
It’s a good thing to know the truth so… I said: “You have to explain to us.” And it was 
awful… We suddenly realized the atrocity. It was like a nightmare, we had to wake up! 
Henri asked: “Do you think we have to explain this to everybody?” We were more 
                                                 
1
 June 2000, Interview by C. Leroy in « 1968-1979 : La décennie des grèves ouvrières » (1968-1979 : The 
decade of working strikes).  
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than about 130 people. I replied: “If we don’t, nobody will do…”” 2(Marie-Jeanne, 
worker at Amisol) 
After the decree of 1977, protest decreased. The law aimed at changing practices. However, 
these changes have not been implemented. Workers weren’t aware of the existing dangers of 
asbestos. Most of them didn’t know the law. They were rather concerned about working 
conditions and the decrease of stress. Information about the risk begun to widespread at the 
end of the 80s. In the 90s, lots of conflicts appeared and asbestos became a central cause. The 
role of the media was then crucial to spread information, and to depict conflicts.  
“We worked in Renault, the decree of 1977? We didn’t hear about it. We had no 
information about risk and asbestos. This report of a security and health committee 
was written just after the law… no reference to it ! We didn’t know we had to change 
our habits. Honestly, that wasn’t a high-priority for us. Thanks to the media at the end 
of the 80s, we were informed that there were conflicts about asbestos. Then media 
helped us to communicate.”3 
 
Pressure groups 
Lots of groups were concerned by the struggle against asbestos. The most famous is the 
“Collectif de Jussieu”. This group represents the professors of Jussieu University in Paris. Its 
most famous member was the Professor H. Pezerat. The role of this group is to federate 
actors. The visit of the Professor H. Pezerat at Amisol was the starting point of a new form of 
debate and mobilization. This group succeeded in mobilizing very different actors such as 
unions, environmental groups or citizens’ groups.  
 
After the 1977 decree, that ratifies the controlled use of asbestos, the mobilization of the 
Collectif de Jussieu decreased. This decrease is due to the shared belief that the government 
had finally decided to solve the problem (and especially progressively ban asbestos).  
  
                                                 
2
 Annie Thébaud-Mony, 2007. « travailler peut nuire gravement à votre santé » (Working can be harmful to your 
health) 
3
 May 2009, Interview of Pierre Bernardini a CGT Renault Union representative 
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In 1995, there was a kind of “re-birth” of the group under the name “Comité Anti Amiante” 
(committee against asbestos). This committee campaigned for the conclusive ban of the use of 
asbestos. One of the main roles of this committee was to collect, centralize and widespread 
information about asbestos. Thanks to their academic position, they had legitimacy to 
participate to the  debate.  
“Whereas foreign countries (USA, North Europa) have implemented a concrete 
prevention policy, nothing has been done at Jussieu (neither protection plan nor 
diagnostics) since the decree of 1978, that banned asbestos flocking in French 
buildings! This is enough !” 4 
“Why do we have to act now although the problem has concerned Jussieu since 20 
years?  
The truth can’t be ignored anymore! Asbestos in Jussieu is a real dangee!  
Why do we want the removal of asbestos?  
It is the only long term decision that can be sustainable! 
 Can we rapidly solve the problem?  
The international context will help us: many European countries banned the use of 
asbestos and implemented prevention policies for buildings. When there is a potential 
danger, asbestos is removed. “5 
 
The defenders of asbestos 
This category gathers actors who want to maintain the asbestos institution. They describe 
asbestos as a fabulous raw material for the French industry. It is a magic mineral with 
fabulous economical and physical properties. Indeed, companies didn’t want to use resources 
to develop substitutes. Some solutions had been discovered in the 70’ but industrialists 
neutralized them because of the additional cost they represented for the production. Up to 
1978, the “Syndicat de l’amiante” and the “Chambre syndicale de l’amiante” (asbestos 
producers’ unions) didn’t want to open the debate around the question of asbestos. The 
conflict appeared due to the threat that some factories could be closed. To put an end to the 
controversy and to a risk of strikes, industrialists approved a controlled use of asbestos. Then 
a real defensive work is implemented to counter actors who advocate for the ban of asbestos. 
This defensive work was embodied by the CPA’s actions (the CPA is presented below). This 
was a “proactive” defensive work. It aims at avoiding new crisis such as the strikes that 
occurred at the end of the 70s. To do this, they did not hesitate to strictly condemn practices 
                                                 
4
 November 1994. Tract distributed in Jussieu University by the “Comité anti-Amiante” 
5
 March 1995. Tract distributed in Jussieu University by the “Comité anti-Amiante” 
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of certain companies. The most typical example is the reaction of the “Syndicat de l’amiante” 
denouncing the practices at Amisol. 
“Since a few years, the head-office of Amisol in Clermont-Ferrand has a scandalous 
attitude. The profession condemns it and rejects the suspicion that he brings for all of 
our members. Our institution wants to help the government to find solutions to help 
the involved workers.”6 
 
Arguments developed by the asbestos unions are twofold. First, they explained that cancers 
(and diseases as a rule) are caused by environmental problems. Second, they presented 
asbestos as a natural ore.  
The producers of asbestos explain that:  
 “Asbestos is a natural ore whose fibres can be found everywhere (in water, in 
land, in air since the earth appeared) and people has used it since thousands of 
years.  
 It is obvious that we can find traces everywhere, even in a source in a pure 
mountain 
 It is wrong and defamatory to pretend that wine, obtained thanks to a process 
that uses asbestos, has more traces of asbestos than the other. It is 
paradoxically the contrary  
 Most often, asbestos is irreplaceable. Thanks to asbestos, thousands of lives 
are saved every year. (fire and thermal isolation) 
 Up to now, the World Health Organization and famous scientific institutions 
emphasize that there is no proof for the existence of a risk that can affect the 
population.”7 
 
In a document produced by the CPA, the dangers of asbestos are surprisingly nuanced: 
“You don’t have to be worried in your everyday life. We are always in contact with 
dangerous elements. That’s why we have to be vigilant. (…) Don’t you think that 
water, fire, electricity, cars, machines… can be the best or the worst depending on 
how we use them? We learnt how to use explosives or radioactive elements. It is the 
same thing for asbestos. Workers and users have to care not being exposed to the 
asbestos dust: only asbestos dust is dangerous.” 8 
 
                                                 
6
 “A propos de l’amiante” (About Asbestos), press release published by the “Syndicat de l’amiante-ciment” and 
the “Chambre syndicale de l’amiante” (asbestos producer unions) the 3rd of November 1976 
7
 “A propos de l’amiante” (About Asbestos), press release published by the “Syndicat de l’amiante-ciment” and 
the “Chambre syndicale de l’amiante” (asbestos producer unions) the 3rd of November 1976 
8
 “Amiante et Santé”(Asbestos and health) published by the “CPA” in 1994.  
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Companies who are not implied in the market of asbestos are also concerned by the problem. 
They are directly in touch with asbestos because they are responsible for the health of their 
employees. Because of the high restoration cost and the competitiveness of asbestos, these 
actors tried to defend asbestos and thus can be considered as defenders of maintenance and 
status quo.  
Doctors / Medical Research Groups 
There are two kinds of doctors concerned by asbestos. The first were the work doctors 
(doctors who controlled and promote health at work). These doctors communicated in very 
specialized symposium. Publication of studies was very bountiful. These doctors knew the 
risks implied in the exposition to asbestos. It seems that they suffered of a lack of 
consideration from authorities. Moreover, their position as executive in the firm explained 
their moderate and nuanced involvement.  
“I was on the side of the workers against Amisol. I wanted to know the truth about this 
firm. I saw the horror as a come-back to the Zola’s period clichés. Asbestos dust 
poisoning was maintained by Amisol. Workers breathed dust 8 hours per day every 
working day. On the floor, we found heaps of asbestos like heaps of sand. In reality, 
there wasn’t any precaution. I already knew, because we learnt it at the Medecine 
University, that it was criminal to do this. I remember conversations with Amisol 
workers. They explained to me that they preferred working in this “coffin-firm» 
whatever dangerous it is.”9 
 
 
Figure 1: Heaps of asbestos (from Liberation 07/12/1976) 
                                                 
9
 April 2007. Doctor Laffont Alain. Interview from « Les Luttes des Amisol ». 
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The second group of doctors is made up of researchers. They belong to research teams or 
public institutions (like the INSERM, that is the French institute in medical research or the 
CIRC, a research institution that is specialized in cancer). All researchers agreed on the 
asbestos toxic properties. Their role in the struggle was to lead scientific research to determine 
the threshold over which there was an health issue. Famous researchers, such as Professor 
Bignon, were influential members of the “CPA”. Their implication in the process was widely 
contested after 1997.  
 
State/ Local Authority: “me-too” actor ?  
Since 1996, victims suited the French government because of its responsibility in endangering 
people’s life. From 1970 to 1977, the government was a passive actor in the debate. Laws and 
decrees relative to asbestos were rather the result of individuals’ struggles. The 1977 decree is 
a compromise to calm people down. It is also a way of showing that the French government 
dealt with the problem of asbestos. The implementation of the CPA is another illustration of a 
wish of finding a compromise between economic interests and population care.  
 
From 1978 to 1995, laws and decrees adopted in France where the adaptation of European 
directives. The position of the French government was embodied by the CPA. In 1995, 
pressures were so important that the ban was unavoidable. 
 
The “Comité permanent Amiante » (CPA) : the institutional compromise.  
The « Comité Permanent Amiante » is a committee created in 1992 by the French 
government. From 1992 to 1995, this committee was composed by researchers, unions, 
asbestos manufacturers, and political representatives. The aim of this committee is to question 
and control the use of asbestos in France. The functioning of this institution is an example of 
defensive work (Maguire & Hardy, 2009). Indeed, this committee promoted the maintainance 
of the institution as defined by the decree published in 1977. It was a central actor in the 
  
- 14 - 
 
debate in France. However, the CPA aroused suspicion and was accused of privileging 
economic interests.  
« Jussieu had knowledge but Amisol was the proof. The meeting between these two 
came like a bombshell. This was the reason why owners had to stem the tide. So they 
created the CPA… They created this committee to have doctors and unions under 
control. “Asbestos, they said, it isn’t good, but there won't be any problem as long as 
some precautions are taken.”And… the science faith… it’s…cultural for workers… so 
we trusted them…”10(Josette) 
 
Media 
The role of media in the asbestos crisis is very important (Henry 2007). The explanatory study 
shows that there is a silent period from 1977 to 1992. Before 1992, the problem of asbestos is 
technical and very specific. Indeed, victims of asbestos mostly were workers. The only 
articles about asbestos were in specialized magazines. Specialized magazines dealt with the 
technical characteristics and the properties of asbestos. There wasn’t a collective 
problematization of the problem.  
“In other words, we can’t find any questions defined as particularly appalling or 
simply debatable. We weren’t able, before 1992, to find in the media a mobilization 
that led to a public visibility.” 11 
 
“At the beginning of the 90s, I wanted that 2 of my journalists spent 4 months (2 
months per journalist) to find something about asbestos. I told them, do what you want 
but find something. Search, I give you the means to do it! There is something… It is 
impossible… It was after the Chernobyl crisis… I knew that there were things… We 
had to find what. So… they did fieldwork… And…They flunked… They came back and 
explained: « there is nothing, we don’t find anything…, there is nothing, there is 
nothing… »”12 
 
                                                 
10
 June 2000, Interview by C. Leroy in « 1968-1979 : La décennie des grèves ouvrières » (1968-1979 : The 
decade of working strikes). 
11
 E. Henry p226 du silence au scandale 
12
 April 1998, Interview of the news editor of “Sciences et Avenir” (Sciences and Future) by E. Henry in “Du 
silence au scandale. Des difficultés des médias d’information à se saisir de la question de l’amiante ». 
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However, a few media dealt with asbestos struggles in Amisol, Ferodo or Jussieu. The aim of 
these articles is to denounce the horror. Media had a tragic approach of the problem. Even if 
the description wanted to be frightening, the problem stayed at a local level and only involved 
workers. 
“Is there somewhere in France such a dramatic conflict, as heartbreaking as Amisol is 
? Can we talk about these workers without feelings? Since 19 months, these workers’ 
feelings moved from pessimism to hope and their action changed from rebellion to 
resignation. What kind of words can translate this ignored scandal?”13 
 
Between 1992 and 1994, the death of six teachers developed the interest of mass media to 
asbestos. Then, there was a multiplication of articles about asbestos. TV shows were 
broadcasted. The new sensational aspect of the asbestos crisis led to a different way of 
treating the problem. The tone used by journalists is alarming. Journalists emphasized the 
tragic feature of the crisis. The tone of articles was really accusing. Accusations against 
authorities and firms were the main points of investigations. The asbestos crisis was depicted 
as a national scandal in a specific context of mad cow disease and infected blood in France. 
Table 1 summarizes the interests and significant actions of the different actors implied in 
asbestos in France. It is divided into four periods to emphasize their dynamic dimension. 
 
 
 
1970-1977 1978-1983 1983-1992 1992-1997 
Workers’ Unions Save employment 
with health 
protection 
No particular 
demand 
No particular 
demand  
Protection and 
compensation  
Pressure groups Health protection Information Information Ban and 
compensation  
Doctors / Medical 
Research Groups 
Control and 
Protection 
Research  
 
Research 
(thresholds) 
Ban  
Companies End of crisis End of crisis Compromise  Low regulation  
                                                 
13
 Liberation, 07/12/76. “Amisol, la plus longue grève”(Amisol, the lenghtest strike) 
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Economic 
interests 
No spread of 
scandal  
Maintain the use 
of asbestos 
Limit their 
responsability 
State/ Local 
Authority 
Controlled use 
(end of crisis and 
economic 
interests) 
Consensus Avoid new 
scandal  
Ban 
Limit their 
responsibility 
The “Comité 
permanent 
Amiante » (CPA) 
  
Controlled use 
Compromise  
 
Media A few regional 
cases 
Workers’ 
diseases 
Silent period Silent period 
(some articles 
in specialized 
press) 
Spread of 
information 
Table 1: Main actors and evolution of their actions and interests 
Method and analysis: 
In order to shed light on institutional residues that have been produced by each struggle, we 
rely on a longitudinal discourse analysis. We have constituted a corpus of texts from press, 
Government, books, press release, tracts, reports,... These texts represent for different periods, 
from 1970 to 1997 the evolution of beliefs, norms and values around the asbestos institution. 
 
 
  
 
1970-1977 1978-1983 1983-1992 1992-1997 
Authors of 
the texts from 
the corpus 
(20 pages) 
- Asbestos Union 
(press release) 
- Media (press, 
radio, TV) 
- Workers’ Union 
(tract) 
- CIRC (Public 
Institution) 
(48 pages) 
- INSERM (public 
Institution, report) 
- Asbestos Union 
(white Paper, press 
release) 
- Government 
(Decree)  
- Workers’ Union 
- Professors (letter 
to the government 
 
 
(79 pages) 
- CPA 
- Press 
(821 pages) 
- Inserm 
- Senate 
- Collectif de 
Jussieu 
- Academy of 
Medecine  
- CPA 
- Press 
 
Table 2: Texts collected for the discourse analysis 
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For each period, we have attempted to collect the most significant texts that have been 
produced by the actors in the field. It is of course impossible to collect every document that is 
related with asbestos. We have rather adopted a pragmatic approach and we have collected 
texts thanks to an extensive research on the Internet, on press database (factiva) and on 
secondary literature (Chateauraynaud and Torny 1999; Evrard 2007; Henry 2007; Lenglet 
1996; Malye 1996). We have also interviewed actors who have granted us an access to 
historic documents. It was an opportunity to determine the most influential texts that have 
been produced at different times. The number of texts depends on each period. Quite 
obviously, between 1970 and 1977, few texts were produced. During this period, asbestos was 
not a significant concern. The discussion is centred on scientists, Workers’ Unions, and the 
Asbestos’ Union. The press has produced some articles, especially about the Amisol affair. 
Between 1978 and 1992, as we said earlier the press is fairly silent about asbestos. The texts 
that are produced are mainly technical and medical. From 1992, there is rapid rise of press 
articles about asbestos that becomes a public concern. This explains the number of texts that 
have been collected, which is significantly higher than the other periods.  
9 semi-structured interviews with different kinds of actors provide a better understanding of 
the field and allow us to observe actors who are directly involved in the issues linked with 
asbestos. These interviews are not integrated in the corpus, in which only texts that have been 
produced in the field from 1970 to 1997 are taken into account. 
 
As for the analysis, it is achieved with Prospéro (Chateauraynaud 2003). This piece of 
software is particularly well adapted for the study of texts produced in a polemic context. It is 
possible to compare texts according to the actors who have produced them and the period at 
which they have been published. In that way, we can expose the existence of residues and the 
slight and progressive evolution in beliefs and norms. In a different context, but with the same 
purpose of subsuming meanings that are conveyed by different actors, Boltanski and 
Chiapello  (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005; Chiapello and Boltanski 1999) have compared two 
corpus of texts with Prospéro and put forward the concept of “projective city”.  
Prospéro represents an interesting tool to analyse texts. More particularly, it can be used to 
compare two corpora and to determine the most significant differences between them. These 
differences are assessed according to the notions that are employed, the actions that are 
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described, the qualities that are associated with notions and also the tone of the text. Prospéro 
is focused on meanings rather than on words.  
The interest of Prospéro does not rely on the automatic production of scoops that anyway 
would clearly appear to any skilled observer of a field. Its interest rather relies on its “analytic 
memory of events” (Chateauraynaud and Torny 1999) and its capacity of comparing different 
events according to definable properties. Many options allow the researcher to understand the 
links different lexis, actors, narrators. Prospéro is far from being a fully automated program 
but constitutes a promising tool to test different hypotheses.  
For this study, the main hypothesis that is tested is the formation of residues after each 
struggle. We want to determine, through a discourse analysis, whether texts reflect normative 
and cognitive differences after a struggle. We compare four periods that are representative of 
four distinct momentums in the field.  We compare the corpus of the period 1 with the corpus 
of the period 2, then the corpus of the period 2 with the period 3 and so on. For each 
comparison, we focus on the changes for: 
- Concepts (“fictive being” with Prospéro’s terminology): for example the concept “asbestos” 
gathers the words “asbestos” but also “magic mineral”, “white gold”, “amphibole”, 
“chrysotile”, … 
- The categories of concepts (for example scientific rhetoric represents the following phrases: 
“abstraction”, “analysis”, experimental approach”, “classification”, “complexity”, 
“deduction”, ...) 
- The categories of action (for example, the category “accuse/critic/complain” represents the 
following phrases: “accuse”, “condemn”, “contest”, “critic”, “denounce”, ...) 
- The categories of markers, that is the way of speaking (for example, the category 
“orientation to the past” indicates the phrases that tend to express a general tone that makes 
reference to the past: “at that time”, “last year”, “before”, “in the past”...) 
- The categories of qualities, that is the qualities that are associated with concepts (for 
example the category “medical” refers to “cardiac”, “carcinogenic”, “clinical”, “digestive”, 
“epidemiologic”, ...) 
Results 
Table 3 gives a general view of the most significant14 differences between the four corpora. 
                                                 
14
 The significance is assessed using the highest variation in the occurrences of a category or a concept between 
two periods for the hundred most used categories or concepts.  
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Period 1: 1970 - 1977 Variation between  the period 1 
and the period 2 (1977- 1983) 
Variation between  the period 2 
and the period 3 (1983- 1992) 
Variation between  the period 3 
and the period 4 (1992 – 1998)  
 
 
% 
 
% 
 
% 
 
Entities @asbestos 
@workers 
@cancer 
risk 
@state 
+265 
+158 
+104 
+93 
+72 
+72 
- 96 
Fibre15 
Study 
Number 
Companies’ doctors 
Asbestos’ Union 
Tobacco 
Dangers 
+196 
+191 
+176 
+127 
-96 
-95 
-95 
@Companies 
Country 
@Building 
Technique 
@Population 
Investigation 
effect 
+750 
+395 
+224 
+218 
+138 
+115 
-100 
-99 
@Cancer 
Exposure 
Study 
Risk 
@workers 
Fibre 
attendees 
Buildings 
Categories  
of entities 
Opinion 
Alert and Dangers 
Scientific rhetoric 
Denunciation 
Statistic reasoning 
+390 
+373 
+344 
+287 
+244 
+177 
+172 
+118 
+115 
+106 
+93 
-90 
-89 
Consequences 
Guarantees 
Investigation 
Rhetoric of change 
Ethic and Moral 
Control and precaution 
Ecological discourse 
Statistical reasoning 
Fault 
Logic of threshold 
Prospective 
State of conscious 
Denunciation 
+943 
+882 
+275 
+268 
+256 
+252 
+237 
+145 
+96 
-84 
-84 
Determinism 
Removal 
Prospective 
Market logics 
Managerial discourse 
Physical constraints 
Political sociology 
Compensation 
Concern 
Working conditions 
Epidemiologic 
approach 
+1293 
+1095 
 
+541 
+403 
+315 
+210 
+192 
+183 
+167 
+149 
+141 
+115 
+112 
+104 
-86 
 
-78 
Trials 
Epidemiologic 
approach 
Working conditions 
Family relationships 
Protests 
Duration 
Compensation 
Judicial logics 
Denunciation 
Statistic reasoning 
State of consciousness 
Threshold 
Guarantee 
Scientific rhetoric 
Macro-economic 
analysis 
Consultation 
                                                 
15
 For example, this line should be read as: the word fibre is 295% times as quoted in the period 2 as in the period 1 
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Categories  
of qualities 
Important 
Dangerous 
Excellent 
Accusing 
+416 
+287 
+201 
+201 
-71 
Medical 
Stop/close 
Complexity 
Observation 
Dangerosity 
+391 
+84 
+84 
-94 
-86 
-81 
Bureaucratic 
Justification 
Adaptability 
Biological 
Medical 
Fragility 
+673 
+586 
+329 
+277 
+214 
+197 
+169 
+151 
Biologic 
Ecologic 
Fragility 
Medical 
Accusation 
Old 
Observation 
Satisfaction 
Categories of 
action 
Know 
Stop/Close 
Defend/support 
Accuse 
Assess 
+330 
+244 
+158 
- 82 
Analyse/observe 
Prove/validate 
Predict 
Stop/close/suspend 
+391 
+329 
+329 
+206 
+165 
+130 
+108 
-70 
-70 
Decide/ 
legislate/prescribe 
Launch an alert 
Manage 
Create 
Repeat/reproduce 
Defend/support 
Advise 
constraint /force 
 
+403 
+320 
+228 
+155 
+151 
+110 
-91 
-84 
Constraint 
Accuse 
Officialise 
Unveil 
Build 
Define/assess 
Promise 
Renounce 
Categories of 
markers  
Negation 
Graduation 
Duration 
Current events 
+373 
+115 
-81 
-79 
Orientation to the 
future 
Closeness 
Evidence 
Conclusive 
+145 
 
+145 
+136 
-80 
-80 
-74 
Maximisation/preferen
ce 
Previous 
Connectors 
Academism 
Evidence 
Unveiling 
+543 
+419 
+354 
+222 
+170 
+160 
+156 
-96 
Comparison 
Time situated 
Academism 
Agenda 
Hypothesis 
Statistic 
Causality 
Maximisation 
Table 3: Variation between the four corpora 
Between 1970 and 1977, the texts mainly denounce the effects of asbestos on workers. For 
the first time, the use of asbestos is linked with cancer, which creates a Sword of Damocles 
hanging over the workers’ heads. The notion of state is often used, which indicates a wish to 
implicate the State to bring a solution to a major health and professional issue. The categories 
of entities refer to denunciation and alert/dangers. This is typical in this period. For the first 
time, asbestos appear as a massive killer for workers whose working conditions are presented 
as alarming. This is reinforced by the category “accuse” that is one of the main actions that 
are expressed in the corpus. The article published by Libération (daily newspaper) is typical. 
The journalist wrote:  
“Is there somewhere in France such a dramatic conflict, as heartbreaking as Amisol is ? Can 
we talk about these workers without feelings? Since 19 months, these workers’ feelings moved 
from pessimism to hope and their action changed from rebellion to resignation. What kind of 
words can translate this ignored scandal?” 
 
Moreover, the discourse in this period is rather argumentative. It puts forward scientific 
rhetoric and statistic reasoning. To that extent, it expresses what is at stakes with the Amisol 
struggle. It is important to “know” and to prove what the impacts of asbestos are. The 
controversy about the threshold for the quantity of asbestos in wine is representative. The 
need for justifications and proves is typical of subordinated groups who do not benefit from 
the higher legitimacy of well established actors, such as manufacturers or asbestos’ Unions. 
The most significant residue of the Amisol case relies on the association between workers, 
asbestos and death (cancer). These three elements will act as a powerful basis for change, 
challenging the legitimacy of asbestos. A group of workers from Amisol holds a sign where it 
is written “doomed to unemployment and to slow death” (see Appendix 1). Even if this sign is 
small and discreet, the underlying idea has its importance to tackle the stability of the asbestos 
institution. 
 
In the second column, the variation between period 1 and period 2 indicates that denunciation 
is no longer significant. Instead, the actions that have considerably increased are 
“observe/analyze”, “prove”, “predict”. To that extent, individuals’ and groups’ actions are 
oriented to a scientific activity. The increase in the use of the word “study” and also the 
quality “medical” corroborates that tendency. There is also one interesting discursive 
phenomenon. The word “fibre” is much more used during the second period. To that extent, 
there is a slight change to maintain the legitimacy of asbestos. Instead of accusing asbestos as 
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a whole, only some fibers are identified and are accused of being responsible of cancer and 
other deceases. Asbestos is not necessarily lethal, but some of its fibers are. This distinction is 
important to justify the ongoing use of asbestos in spite of many deaths. 
The increase in the use of categories like “consequences”, or “rhetoric of change” is 
meaningful. It shows a whish of changing things. Besides, the categories “guarantees” and 
“investigation” shows an attempt of reassuring people. It is an answer to the first period that 
develops a feeling of doubt about asbestos. In the second period, asbestos is presented as an 
issue that can be controlled as long as “precautions” are taken. Asbestos is not necessarily 
dangerous if it is used properly. To that extent, it is important to investigate on thresholds to 
minimize potential hazards. This defensive work is proactive. A compromise tends to be fund: 
the dangers of asbestos are recognized but in the same time swept away since they can be 
controlled. This second struggle led to cognitive and normative residues. The use of asbestos 
has to be quasi-scientific. It is not dangerous if it is properly used. Investigations can 
determine the dangerous fibres responsible of deceases.  The issue is to determine the good 
practices to use asbestos that is still an irreplaceable material. With the rhetoric of change, 
texts are fairly reinsuring and professionals of asbestos can be trusted. 
 
The variations between the period 2 and the period 3 indicate an optimization momentum. 
The main actions are linked with management: what is the best organization to constrain a 
proper use of asbestos? The issue of studies and investigations is no longer prevailing (the use 
of “medical” for example has declined). The most expressed actions are “decide”, “prescribe”, 
“legislate”, “manage”. This is corroborated by other categories, like “managerial discourse”, 
“bureaucratic” or “maximisation/preference”. The field is organized around the CPA that 
appears to be a central entity. They can prescribe the best practices to reconcile both 
economic interests and protection of workers. Whereas the previous period was projective and 
tended to foster investigations, the scientific dimension of the field in this period appears 
secondary. There is rather a determinist dimension: “workers need to do...”, “we should ...” as 
if everything were known about asbestos. 
The CPA appears as a normative organization that gives stability to the field. It bridges 
economic interests (the category of market logics has almost tripled) with protection of 
workers. 
The CPA also brings a cognitive residue, legitimating the asbestos as long as there is a central 
entity that can control, prescribe and ensure stability. 
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The last period is particularly interesting. It shows the re-emergence of concepts that were 
preeminent in the first period. Asbestos is associated with cancer again. The case of Amisol is 
used in certain texts like a past echo that conveys the long history of asbestos contestation. 
The word “study” is much more used. The controllability of asbestos is no longer taken for 
granted. 
This period, like the first one is a period of contestation, which is attested by the 
multiplication of trials. The main actions expressed in this period are “to constrain” and “to 
accuse”. What is taken for granted has to be “unveiled”.  
Some actors are presented as responsible for the deaths and future deaths provoked by 
asbestos. In the categories of markers, “causality” has more than doubled.  
The logic is now far from being managerial. On the contrary past doubts are reactivated. 
Ecologic and biologic discourses emerge. Actions are situated in time, such as “today”, 
“now”, ... which indicates the awareness of the dangers of asbestos and the wish to change 
things. 
 
Figure 2 represents the dynamics underlying the successive residues that have been produced 
along the different periods that we have studied. It emphasizes the interrelation between the 
three pillars. 
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ASBESTOS RESIDUES 
 1970 1977 1983 1992 1997 
 
 
 
 
 
Régulat
ive 
Normat
ive 
Cogniti
ve 
Decree 
threshold  of 
exposition 
 
Ban of 
flocking 
Research studies as source of 
legitimity (polemical case of the wine) 
Asbestoscancerdeath 
 
Unfairness for workers 
Controled use of Asbestos 
Only dust of asbestos is 
dangerous 
Concerted actions can improve 
the use of asbestos and the 
safety for workers 
Ban of 
asbestos 
Lower threshold of exposition  
Adaptation of European 
directives 
Asbestos can and must be 
controled by a centralizing 
institution 
Necessity of a compromise 
that satisfies all the 
stakeholders 
Indemnify victims 
Denounce the scandal  
Unmasking the role of 
CPA & government 
Judiciarisation and 
complaints 
Asbestos = death & 
responsibility of firms 
Come back of cognition 
elements aslept from 1977 
to 1992 
Amisol as the symbol 
of the fight & the 
unfairness 
Studies proliferation to take decisions 
CPA as referent in the definition of new practices 
Figure 2: Interrelation between the cognitive, normative and regulative residues 
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Conclusions 
In this paper, we have attempted to understand the residues produced by a succession of 
struggles and tried to study to which extent these residues participate in a 
deinstitutionalization process. The notion of struggles is here employed in a wide acceptation. 
We do not argue that, in a struggle, individuals’ actions are opposed to active challengers who 
always strongly defend their positions. We refer to a vision of struggles that is more subtle. 
Struggles are enacted in a contestation area where oppositions are not always expressed, but 
just latent and ready to emerge. Struggles are a part of a dialogic process in which oppositions 
are permanent. The compromise is never fully achieved, and dormant antagonisms can be 
expressed in particular situations, especially during crisis.  
Our study interestingly shows a manifestation of a dormant antagonism that comes back to 
public consideration almost twenty years later. In the first period, especially due to the Amisol 
struggle, asbestos has been associated with workers and death (cancer). It was considered as a 
harmful material having shameful and unfair consequences for workers who had to choose 
between unemployment and illness. However, this struggle did not deeply modify the 
institutional order. The importation of asbestos still increased. Asbestos was used everywhere. 
However, Amisol left a powerful residue that is fully expressed 20 years later, when asbestos, 
again, is associated with cancer and dangers. Amisol constitutes a symbolic representation of 
asbestos’ consequences and it is re-used in the texts of the last period.  
Besides, Amisol and the debate around drinks and asbestos have induced a slight change into 
the normative pillar. The use of asbestos need to be legitimated by scientific studies. This 
residue has caused a series of incremental changes in that direction. To that extent, the 
appearance of the CPA is fairly natural and expected. It acts as a regulative residue mainly 
produced by the Asbestos’ Union. The CPA – as a formal entity – constraints actors’ 
behaviour in the field. At that time, there is a strong alignment between the three pillars. The 
CPA constitutes a formal entity that enables the normative and cognitive pillars. Asbestos is 
not described as dangerous per se. Only bad practices are noxious. To that extent, it is 
important to condition the use of asbestos to investigations and scientific results. This is the 
area of a controlled use of asbestos. This area is fairly stable, and represents a compromise 
between different actors.   
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This area has emerged in the continuation of another residue produced in the second period. 
The proliferation of studies has led to a scientific use of asbestos and a distinction between 
asbestos as a whole and its dangerous components like micro-fibres.  
The last period could be studied alone to explain the de-institutionalization of asbestos. 
However, it would have erased the complex dynamics that has prepared the basis of change. 
In particular, we can see the complex role of residues that may remain dormant at certain 
times. The concept of residue embodies many antagonisms in a field that should not be 
underestimated. Cognitive residues act as a source of legitimacy for change at certain times, 
normative residues can influence practices and beliefs, and regulative residues can act in a 
facilitative way, empowering certain actors in specific times. 
 
In this paper, we contribute to the analysis of specific aspects of deinstitutionalization. In the 
institutional literature, this process has been rarely tackled (for exception, we can refer to 
Maguire and Hardy 2009; Oliver 1992). It is yet a fundamental and specific dimension of 
institutional life. 
More particularly, we analyze institutions and institutional work in a dynamic perspective. 
This work relies on a longitudinal approach and we assume the temporal effects of actions. 
We underline the mechanisms of struggles in a field and support the idea that institutional 
work should be studied without dissociating efforts to change institutions and efforts to 
maintain them. At a particular time, the institution is made up of complex arrangements and 
interrelated strategies for persistence and change. 
The use of a piece of software, Prospéro, for a longitudinal discourse analysis is also 
promising. It allows us to proceed to an adaptable analysis of texts, based on statistical 
comparisons according to actors and times. Prospéro, as a semi-automated program, can 
provide results based on statistical measures but also entirely configurable to integrate the 
specificities of each context and also to test many research hypotheses. 
As a theoretical contribution, we put forward the notion of institutional residue. It emphasizes 
the role, and finally the significance of individuals’ actions. Most actions are not vain, and 
contribute to a slight change or to latent conflicts that will be crystallized with a jolt and will 
contribute, at a particular time, to the precipitation of the institution. Deinstitutionalization is 
viewed as a cumulative process, constituted with a set of residues, and not a disruption 
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essentially provoked by a jolt. In that way, we emphasize micro-processes in the institutional 
dynamics. Some events, like the strike at Amisol, the mobilization of Jussieu, even if they are 
local and not generalized are quite important in the field. To that extent we underline the role 
of struggles and actions, even if, most often they seem to have modest impact. 
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Appendix 1: Doomed to unemployment and to slow death… (“La vie ouvrière” (magazine for workers), 07/20/76) 
